The Effects of Inflation on the Law of Obligations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay by Rosenn, Keith S
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 2
Issue 2 Latin American Commercial Law Symposium Article 4
1-1-1979
The Effects of Inflation on the Law of Obligations
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay
Keith S. Rosenn
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston
College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keith S. Rosenn, The Effects of Inflation on the Law of Obligations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Uruguay, 2 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 269 (1979), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol2/
iss2/4
The Effects of Inflation on the Law of Obligations 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay* 
by Keith S. Rosenn * * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Inflation has been a chronic socio-economic problem in several Latin 
American countries ever since World War II. Were a prize given for the 
dubious distinction of achieving the highest rates of inflation in the world, the 
leading contenders would almost always be the countries of the southern cone 
of South America. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study of 53 coun-
tries for which price level data were available between 1949 and 1965 placed 
six countries in a class by themselves, far surpassing the inflation rates of all 
the other countries.! One of the six was Korea, which had been a battleground 
during much of the period under study. The other five countries - Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay - had no war to blame for their 
high rates of inflation. In 1957-1958 Bolivia managed to squeeze the genie of 
inflation back into the bottle via a brutal stabilization program,2 but the other 
four Latin American countries have been unable to replicate that feat. During 
the 1960-1965 period they managed to achieve the highest inflatioll rates of all 
the countries in the IMF study. In first place during this period was Brazil 
with an annual average inflation rate of 58 percent, followed by Uruguay with 
32 percent, Chile with 25 percent, and Argentina with 24 percent. 3 
'Copyright 1979 Keith S. Rosenn . 
.. Professor of Law, Ohio State University. 
1. Adekunle, Rates of Inflation in Industrial, Other Developed, and Less Developed Countries, 
1949-1965, 15 I.M.F. STAFF PAPERS 531 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Adekunle]. 
2. For an insider's account of this stabilization program, see G. EDER, INFLATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE HISTORY OF INFLATION AND STABILIZATION IN 
BOLIVIA (1968). 
3. Adekunle, supra note 1, at 536. 
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During the 1970s the pace of inflation has accelerated sharply in Argentina, 
Chile, and Uruguay. In the 1971-1977 period Chile had an annual average in-
flation rate of 286.4 percent, by far the world's highest. Argentina was second 
with an annual average of 174.5 percent, followed by Uruguay with an annual 
average of 74 percent, and Brazil with an annual average of 28.6 percent. 
(Ominously, Colombia and Peru, with annual average inflation rates of 22.4 
percent and 21.5 percent, respectively, were not far behind.)4 
The U.S. reader can obtain a greater sense of perspective by considering 
the effect these sustained high rates of inflation have had on indexed wages 
and exchange rates. Ifa worker earning $1,000 a month in 1971 had his salary 
indexed to the Chilean consumer price index, in 1977 he would have been 
earning $551,872 a month. One new Chilean peso was worth U.S. $62.50 in 
1971; as of mid-January 1979 there were 34.1 pesos to one U.S. dollar. The 
dollar exchange rate for the Argentine peso was U.S. $1 = 5 pesos in 1971; in 
mid-January 1979 it stood at U.S. $1 = 1028 pesos. Moreover, the dollar has 
itself depreciated considerably in the world's currency marts. If one uses the 
International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Right (SDR)5 as a basis of 
comparison, the rate of devaluation is even more striking. There were 5.43 
Argentine pesos to a SDR in 1971; on January 25, 1979 there were 1350, an 
increase of nearly 250 times. 6 
There are three unique factors about the inflationary processes in these 
Latin American countries. First, these inflations are chronic. They have been 
going on steadily for more than thirty years in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 
and for more than twenty years in Uruguay. 7 Second, these inflations have 
never degenerated into runaway or hyperinflation, such as Germany, Austria, 
Hungary, Poland, and Russia experienced in the post-World War I period. s 
Instead, as can be seen from Table I, these Latin American inflations have 
alternated between cantering and galloping levels of intensity, with an occa-
sional trot during the peak of a stabilization program. Third, these Latin 
American inflations are not attributable to any of the usual causes of severe in-
flation: external war, foreign occupations, or revolution. Coups d'etat have 
4. These inflation rates are calculated from price data appearing in INT'L MONETARY FUND, 
31 INT'L FINANCIAL STATISTICS No.9 (Sept. 1978) and 29 INT'L FINANCIAL STATISTICS No. 11 
(Nov. 1976). 
5. The SRD is a kind of paper gold, created as a new reserve asset by the International 
Monetary Fund in 1969. Its unit value was orginally pegged to the gold value of the U.S. dollar. 
In the wake of the 1971 decision by the United States to allow its currency to float and to end of-
ficial convertibility of dollars for gold, the value of the SDR is determined daily by reference to a 
weighted average of the currencies of 16 member nations with more than one percent of the 
world's exports of goods and services during a five-year period. INT'L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL 
REPORT 56-57 (1978). 
6. 8 I.M.F. SURVEY 45 (No.3, Feb. 5, 1979). 
7. See F. PAZOS, CHRONIC INFLATION IN LATIN AMERICA 13-16 (1972). 
8. /d. at 18-19. 
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TABLE 19 
Average Annual Percentage Increases in Consumer Price Indexes of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, 1949-1977 
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay 
1949 31 5 19 5 
1950 26 9 15 -5 
1951 37 12 22 12 
1952 39 17 22 17 
1953 4 14 26 5 
1954 4 22 56 5 
1955 12 23 76 8 
1956 13 21 66 7 
1957 25 16 29 15 
1958 32 15 26 18 
1959 114 39 39 40 
1960 27 29 12 39 
1961 14 33 8 23 
1962 26 52 14 11 
1963 26 70 44 21 
1964 22 92 46 43 
1965 29 66 29 57 
1966 32 41 23 74 
1967 29 31 18 89 
1968 16 22 27 125 
1969 8 22 31 21 
1970 14 23 33 16 
1971 35 20 19 24 
1972 59 16 100 78 
1973 61 13 338 97 
1974 23 28 503 77 
1975 183 29 374 81 
1976 543 42 312 51 
1977 176 44 92 58 
been triggered, at least in part, by a regime's apparent inability to control in-
flation, but seldom has inflation been triggered by revolutions. to 
The causes of these inflations are complex and much mooted. Space limita-
9. The statistics in this Table are derived from id. at 14 for the period through 1970, and INT'L 
MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STATISTICS (Nov. 1976) and INT'L MONETARY 
FUND, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STATISTICS (Sept. 1978) for the period 1970-1977. 
10. The inability to control spiralling inflations was one of the key factors inducing the 
military to topple Goulart in Brazil in 1964, Allende in Chile in 1973, and Peron in Argentina in 
1976. 
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tions preclude their exploration here. 11 Suffice it to say that few policymakers 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay entertain any serious notions about 
completely eliminating inflation in their respecitve countries. Most would be 
quite content to reduce the inflation rate to so-called "normal" levels - ap-
proximately 10 to 15 percent a year. 12 
Legal systems depend on money to perform three essential functions. 
Money serves as: (1) a means oj payment, facilitating the exchange of goods and 
services; (2) a store oj value, facilitating savings and deferred payment of obliga-
tions; and (3) a measure oj value, permitting a common method of determining 
the economic worth of goods and services. 13 After decades of severe inflation 
the currencies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay no longer function 
either as measures or stores of value. Living with inflation has forced the legal 
systems of these countries to develop alternative methods for performing these 
vital functions. 
Inflation affects legal systems in myriad ways. Taxation, rents, mortgages, 
insurance, pensions, corporate balance sheets, public utility rates, and 
damage awards are among the legal institutions most seriously distorted by in-
flation. Rather than attempt to discuss all of these areas, this article will focus 
on the law of obligations, a topic which lies at the heart of any civil law system 
and encompasses both torts and contracts. 
This is a particularly appropriate time to study the effects of inflation on 
Latin American legal institutions. Inflation is all too vividly our own problem. 
Legal institutions in the United States are experiencing currently many of the 
same distortions as those in South American countries. Because of the much 
greater intensity and duration of the South American inflationary experience, 
these distortions are amplified many times. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
inflationary experience has forced South American legislators and courts to 
confront the legal distortions generated by inflation and to devise imaginative 
solutions to prevent the breakdown of legal structures. There is much we in 
the United States can learn from studying this aspect of Latin American law. 
II. THE RISE OF VALORISM AND THE EROSION OF NOMINALISM 
During most of recorded history, the doctrine of metallism has dominated 
legal perceptions about the value of money. Metallism equates the value of 
money with the value of a determined weight and fineness of precious metal, 
generally gold or silver. So long as money consisted of chunks of precious 
metals, metallism presented few legal problems. But with the advent of 
11. See generally S. WACHTER, LATIN AMERICAN INFLATION, THE STRUCTURALIST-
MONETARIST DEBATE (1976); Baer, The Inflation Controversy in Latin America: A Survry, 2 LATIN AM. 
RESEARCH REV. 3 (1967). 
12. See, e.g., S. ROBOCK, BRAZIL A STUDY IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS 127 (1975). 
13. Doucet, Le Franc du 8 Mars 1803 au Decembri 1958, in INFLUENCE DE LA DEPRECIATION 
MONETAIRE SUR LA VIEjURIDIQUE PRIVEE 1, 3-4 (P. Durand ed. 1961). 
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coinage, an activity soon monopolized by sovereigns for prestige and profit, 
legal theory had to confront problems presented by widespread debasement 
and alteration in the value of coins. If a debtor had agreed to repay ten gold 
ducats (of unspecified gold content), and between the date ofthe loan and the 
date of repayment, the sovereign reduced the gold content of the ducat by 50 
percent, was the debtor obligated to repay ten or twenty ducats? 
During the Middle Ages it was generally agreed that the debtor was re-
quired to repay the quantity of gold borrowed rather than the number of 
monetary units. This conclusion was derived partly from Roman law, which, 
as interpreted by the Glossators and post-Glossators, regarded the metallic 
content of money as the sum and substance of pecuniary obligations. a It also 
was derived in part from a sense of natural justice. Since canon law forbade 
the charging of interest, it was deemed only just to protect the creditor against 
any loss for monetary depreciation. IS 
This view was seriously challenged in 1546 by the enormously influential 
French jurist, Charles Dumoulin (Molinaeus), in his treatise Tractatus Contrac-
tuum et Usurarum. In his treatment of usury, Dumoulin discredited the 
Canonists' metallistic interpretation of Roman law and vigorously criticized 
the view that money is a commodity whose value is determined by its metallic 
content. Laying the doctrinal support for nominalism, Dumoulin contended 
that the only value of money for juridical purposes is the value imposed by the 
sovereign. 16 Dumoulin's arguments struck a responsive chord with the French 
monarchy, which was seeking to consolidate royal power at the expense of 
feudal princes and the church. Within five years of the appearance of 
Dumoulin's treatise, the French king issued a decree requiring all contracts to 
specify pecuniary amounts by the nominal value of coins instead of metallic 
weightsY 
During the 16th and 17th centuries there were bitter doctrinal disputes be-
tween adherents of nominalism and metallism. The former urged that for the 
purpose of discharging legal obligations, the value of money should be its face 
or nominal value, which should be irrebutably presumed constant. The latter 
urged that legal obligations should be discharged only upon payment of a sum 
which corresponded to the intrinsic metallic value of the sum at the time the 
obligation had been incurred. Nominalism is far more convenient than 
metallism, for it avoids the difficult task of inquiring into the relative values of 
goods and services over time. This advantage made nominalism more useful 
14. F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 79 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as F. MANN]. 
15. A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAw NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 176 (rev'd ed. 1950) 
[hereinafter cited as A. NUSSBAUM]. 
16. [d. at 177; F. MANN, supra note 14, at 177; A. WALD, A CLAUSULA DE ESCALA M6vEL 47 
(2d ed. 1959). . 
17. F. MANN, supra note 14, at 79-80. 
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to the development of modern capitalism. This greater utility, coupled with 
royal sponsorship, ultimately led to widespread acceptance of nominalism dur-
ing the 17th and 18th centuries. 18 
The orientation of one of the world's most highly influential legal 
documents, the Napoleonic Code, is decidedly nominalistic. This orientation 
is most explicitly embodied in Article 1895, which provides: 
The obligation which results from a loan of money is always only the 
numerical sum stated in the contract. If the value of money has in-
creased or decreased before the time of payment, the debtor must 
repay only the numerical sum lent in the lawful currency at the time 
of payment. 19 
Latin American codifiers were heavily influenced by the Napoleonic Code, 
and similar provisions were incorporated into most of Latin American civil 
codes. 20 Although stated only in terms ofloans, the nominalist principle gener-
ally has been applied to all obligations to pay sums of money.21 
Nominalism presupposes a reasonably stable currency.22 During severe in-
flation, when currencies cease to function in an economic sense either as a 
measure or store of value, there is often a juridical reaction against the 
rigidities of the nominalist principle. Prior to the 20th century, judicial reac-
tions against nominalism were essentially based on a metallistic concept of the 
value of money.23 During the highly inflationary post-World War I period, 
18. T. ASCARELLI, PROBLEMS DAS SOCIEDADES ANONIMAS E DIREITO COMPARADO 194 (1945). 
19. CODE NAPOLEON art. 1895 (translated by the author). 
20. E.g., C6DIGOCIVILart. 619 (Argen.); C6DIGOCIVIL art. 2199 (Chile); C6DIGO CIVIL art. 
2389 (Mex.); C6DIGO CIVIL art. 2199 (Uruguay); C6DIGO CIVIL art. 1737 (Venez.). 
21. F. MANN, supra note 14, at 80-81. 
22. As Professor Mann has observed: 
Nominalism primarily applies to fluctuations in the value of money, which are slow, 
gradual, and moderate. There is no certainty how English law would react in the 
unlikely event of the pound sterling depreciating in so violent, sudden, and extreme a 
manner as to lead to a collapse of the monetary system. Experience proves that in such a 
contingency nominalism cannot, in practice, be maintained and that the legislator or, 
failing him, the judge must afford relief. 
Id. at 92. 
Perhaps nowhere is the presupposition of monetary stability more clearly articulated than in 
the note of Velez Sarsfield, the principal draftsman of the Argentine Civil Code, to Article 619, 
which embodies the nominalist principle. Ve1ez wrote: 
We abstain from projecting laws to settle the much debated question regarding the 
obligation of the debtor when there has been alteration in the currency, because that 
alteration would have to be ordered by the national legislative body, an almost impossi-
ble occurrence .... If the intrinsic value of money is altered - says the Code of 
Austria - the person who received it must reimburse the full value that it had at the 
time of the loan. If one had to promulgate a law, supposing the alteration of currencies, 
we would accept the article of the Austrian Code. 
C6DIGO CIVIL art. 619 note (Argen.) (translated by the author). 
23. For example, American courts utilized the gold value of Confederate currency to 
revalorize contracts which had become worthless after the Civil War. Dawson & Cooper, The Ef-
fect of Inflation on Private Contracts: The United States, 1861-1879, 33 MICH. L. REV. 706 (1934) 
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particularly in Europe, a group of jurists and economists reacted against the 
injustice resulting from adherence to the nominalist principle by urging that 
the legal value of money be ascertained by reference to its purchasing power 
rather than its intrinsic metallic value. These modern heirs of the metallists 
have been dubbed' 'valorists.' '24 
The basic tenet of valorism is that pecuniary obligations should be dis-
charged only upon payment of a sum which corresponds to the real economic 
value of the obligation owed. The real economic value of money is its purchas-
ing power rather than the number of units of gold or silver for which it can be 
exchanged. By the end of World War I a number of countries were publishing 
weighted price indexe·s on a regular basis. 25 It was to these indexes that the 
valorists turned to measure the value of money. Quite correctly, the valorists 
perceived that the best measure of money's purchasing power is a general 
price index, such as the consumer or wholesale price index. 
The valorists were particularly influential during the 1920s in Germany, 
which was the only country in which the judiciary initiated and dominated an 
attempt to revise contractual obligations along largely valoristic lines. 26 But 
once the mark had been restabilized, Germany reverted to nominalism. Dur-
ing the Great Depression of the 1930s, jurists ceased to be concerned with 
problems of inflation and the influence of valorism waned. 
In the past two decades there has been a renascence of valorism in the 
southern cone of South America. In order to permit their legal systems to 
continue to function with such continuously high rates of inflation, jurists and 
legislatures in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay have resorted to indexa-
tion, or monetary correction as it is frequently called, to readjust a great vari-
ety of legal transactions. In these countries wages, back pay awards, interest 
payments, condemnation awards, rents, mortgages, bonds, corporate balance 
sheets, loans, social security payments, and the income tax system are ad-
justed periodically in accordance with coefficients derived from the price in-
dexes. 27 This does not mean that the legal systems of these countries have jet-
[hereinafter cited as Dawson & Cooper]. The story of legislative efforts in the United States and 
France to revalorize worthless currency by reference to specie standards is told in E. 
HARGREAVES, RESTORING CURRENCY STANDARDS (1926) [hereinafter cited as E. HARGREAVES]. 
24. E. HIRSCHBERG, THE NOMINALISTIC PRINCIPLE 74·75 (1971). 
25. A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 28-29; G. WARREN & F. PEARSON, PRICES 18-23 (rev'd ed. 
1933); Walsh, Index Numbers, 7-8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 652-54 (rev'd ed. 
1937). 
26. A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 215. See generally Dawson, Effects of Iriflation on Private Con-
tracts: Germany, 1914-1921, 33 MICH. L. REV. 171 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Dawson]. 
27. Discussion of all of these types of monetary correction is beyond the scope of this article. A 
much more complete discussion, albeit not specifically focused upon these four Latin American 
countries, appears in K. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION (forthcoming). For Argentina, see L. GUR· 
FINKEL DE WENDY, DEPRECIACION MONETARIA: REVALUACION DE DEUDAS DINERARIAS (1977) 
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tisoned nominalism and embraced valorism as a general principle. Techni-
cally, nominalism is still the general rule. Indexation generally applies only if 
the parties to a contract have so stipulated or there is a specific legal norm 
mandating that result. Though there are still important transactions which are 
not indexed, most legal transactions are structured by taking into account 
changes in the price indexes. 
III. REVISION OF CONTRACTS BADLY DISTORTED BY 
UNANTICIPATED INFLATION 
A sharp surge in the inflation rate places severe pressure on the legal institu-
tion of contracts. Performance of agreements entered into upon the assump-
tion that the value of money is relatively stable creates substantial hardship 
whenever unanticipated inflation vitiates that assumption. This hardship is 
most apparent in contracts whose performance is spread out over a con-
siderable period of time, such as construction contracts, mortgages, leases, in-
surance policies, annuities, or installment sales. In this circumstance 
legislators and judges come under considerable pressure from two distinct 
economic classes: promisors whose contractual obligations have become un-
duly burdensome because of unanticipated inflation, and long-term creditors 
whose claims will be virtually wiped out if debtors are allowed to pay them off 
in badly depreciated currency. 
These pressures pose a serious dilemma for legislatures and courts. If they 
decide to permit revalorization of certain contractual obligations, they run the 
risk of undermining transactional security. They must also resolve the thorny 
question of which categories of obligations should be valorized and on what 
bases. Should the legislature merely attempt to lay down broad guidelines and 
rely on the courts to attempt to reach equitable solutions on a case-by-case 
basis? Or should the legislature set out with considerable specificity the 
categories of obligors entitled to relief? Should the legislature go further and 
set out what relief each c~tegory is entitled to receive? 
The economic, social, and legal problems involved in any legislative or 
judicial attempt to revalorize obligations are immense. First is the largely in-
tractable problem of what standard of value to substitute for money. Prices 
gyrate widely during galloping inflation, and the price indexes are a somewhat 
uncertain guide to the mercurial changes in the prices of many goods and serv-
ices. Prices frequently vary considerably from day to day and from region to 
[hereinafter cited as L. GURFINKEL DE WENDY]; for Brazil, see J. CHACEL, M. SIMONSEN, & A. 
WALD, CORREOAO, MONETARIA (1970) [hereinafter cited as J. CHACEL, et al.]; for Chile, see 
Gesche Miiller, La Compensation de la Desvalorizacion Monetaria en el Cumplimiento de las Obligaciones, 
41 Revista de Derecho [Rev. Der.] 7 (Jan.-June 1974) [hereinafter cited as Gesche Miiller]; 
Alvarez Nunez, Las Obligaciones de Dinero en el CDdigo Civil, 41 Rev. Der. 43 (Jan.-June 1974). For 
Uruguay, see D. FERRERE-LAMAISON, EL DINERO EN LA TEORIAJURIDICA (1974). 
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region. Price controls and shortages exacerbate the problem, for index makers 
all too often utilize official prices, even though commodities are nowhere to be 
found at such prices. 28 In addition, governments have occasionally decided 
that it is easier to control price indexes than to control inflation,29 a 
phenomenon which further exacerbates the reliability problem. But despite 
these difficulties, coefficients derived from the price indexes are likely to be 
more reliable measures of value than foreign exchange rates or gold prices. 
Foreign exchange rates of Latin American countries historically have been 
pegged artificially rather then freely floating, and gold prices reflect 
speculative pressures and panicky flights from currency. 
Second, it is extremely difficult to reconstruct the intentions of parties who 
have contracted in depreciating currency. When people enter into contracts 
payable in Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, or Uruguayan currency, it is only 
logical to assume that one or more of the parties has assumed the risk of a cer-
tain amount of inflation. But is it reasonable to assume that one party has 
assumed the risk of any rate of inflation? If the annual inflation rate had been 
10 percent for the past five years, is it reasonable to charge a person who lent 
money at 12 percent annual interest with all of the economic loss resulting 
from a tenfold spurt in the inflation rate? Suppose the lender was limited to 12 
percent by a usury statute, or suppose protective devices such as index clauses 
were prohibited by law? If one does decide to revalorize contractual obliga-
tions, doing so on the assumption that the parties contemplated a stable cur-
28. For example, the official Chilean consumer price index was widely believed to have 
understated the actual inflation rate by a considerable amount during the Allende period because 
it failed to take into account the widespread black markets spawned by extensive price controls. 
G. JUD. INFLATION AND THE USE OF INDEXING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 81 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as G. JUD]. 
29. Brazilian manipulation of the price indexes is notorious. In the first quarter of 1966 the 
weight accorded to rent in Rio de Janeiro's cost-of-living index, generally regarded as the key in-
flation barometer in the country, was virtually halved without a new market basket survey. This 
ad hoc reweighting coincided with the introduction of legislation relaxing rent controls. See 
Rosenn, Controlled Rents and Uncontrolled Inflation: The Brazilian Delimma, 17 AM. J. COMPo L. 239, 
255 n.66 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Rosenn, Controlled Rents]. In October of 1969, when a frost 
destroyed much of the coffee crop, changes in export prices were eliminated from the wholesale 
price index, which was used to readjust government bonds for inflation. J. CHACEL. et ai, supra 
note 27, at 310. In December of 1972, when the inflation rate appeared to be declining, the 
Brazilian government's estimate of the future inflation rate was given equal weight to past infla-
tion recorded by the wholesale price index in order to reduce the amount by which government 
bonds were readjusted. CO"tcj.o Monelana e Realimentaciio Inflacionaria, Conjuntura Economica 
[Conj. Econ.], June 1976, 88, 92. This estimate offuture inflation was eliminated from the index 
in March of 1974, when it became apparent that the rate of inflation was increasing. In 1975 the 
government decided to purge the wholesale price index of "inflationary accidents," character-
ized as seasonal fluctuations, droughts, frosts, and oil import. Ste Rosenn, Adjusting Taxation of 
Business Income for Inflation: Lessons from Brazil and Chile, 13 TEX. INT'L L. J. 165, 192 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Rosenn]. A recently revealed classified Brazilian government study and a 
World Bank study estimated the actual rise in Rio's cost of living in 1973 at 26.6 percent; the 
cost-of-living index officially registered only 13.7 percent for 1973. Vidal, Brazilian Labor Federa-
tion Brings Court Action Against Government, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § I, at 64, col. 3. 
278 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2, No.2 
rency is likely to be grossly unfair to debtors; failure to revalorize on the 
assumption that the parties fairly contemplated a sharp rise in the "normal" 
inflation rate is likely to be equally unfair to creditors. 
Generally speaking, the legislatures of these Latin American countries have 
left the question of whether to relieve parties from contracts which have 
become unduly burdensome because of inflation to the courts. Unlike 
American, Austrian, French, German, and Polish legislatures, all of which 
enacted general legislation revalorizing specific categories of obligation ex-
pressed in badly depreciated currency, 30 these Latin American legislatures 
have mandated revalorization only in a very limited number of circumstances. 
Such exceptional legislation generally has been aimed at protecting the 
government's own patrimony or the smooth operation of government services 
rather than bailing out improvident contractors. Thus, in 1977, Argentina 
enacted an extraordinary measure imposing prospective revalorization, in ac-
cordance with coefficients derived from an industrial wage index for Buenos 
Aires, on all unindexed debts and mortgages contracted with the National 
Housing Bank. 31 One of the first indexation statutes adopted in Brazil and 
Chile provided for monetary correction of delinquent tax debts to discourage 
the popular practice of borrowing from the government at negative interest 
rates by failing to pay one's taxes on time. 32 A similar statute was enacted by 
Argentina in 1976.33 In 1967 Brazil adopted legislation providing for revision 
of public works contracts in accordance with a formula that relieved the firm 
contracting with the government of 90 percent of the inflation experienced 
following submission of the bid. 34 
30. The experiences of these countries with statutes scaling debts in collapsed currencies 'by 
given percentages are described in E. HARGREAVES. supra note 23; Dawson & Cooper, supra note 
23; Dawson, supra note 26; Picard, Le Remhoursement des Detles etla Valorisation des Creanees dans les 
Pays a Monnaie Depreeiee, 51 CLUNET 918 (1924). 
31. Law No. 21.508 of Feb. 21, 1977 (Argen.). Debtors were afforded the option of avoiding 
revalorization by paying off their debts with the National Mortgage Bank in full within 90 days of 
the statute's effective date. /d. This statute was enacted because inflation had rendered the 
Bank's receipts from interest and amortization insufficient to pay operating expenses, let alone 
maintain its capital. 
32. Since 1964, Brazil has subjected back taxes to monetary correction in accordance with 
coefficients derived from wholesale price index. Law No. 4.357 of July 16, 1964, art. 7 (Braz.). 
Late penalties have also been subject to monetary correction since 1967. Decree-Law No. 326 of 
May 8, 1967, art. 12, (Braz.). 
Chile has required monetary correction of back tax debts since 1965. Late tax payments are 
now charged interest of 1.5 percent a month, a flat 5 percent penalty, and monetary correction in 
accordance with coefficients derived from the consumer price index. Rosenn, supra note 29, at 
187. 
33. Law No. 21.281 of April 2, 1976 (Argen.). All delinquent tax payments must be updated 
by coefficients derived from the wholesale price index between the date the obligation is actually 
paid and the month prior to the date the payment was due. 
34. Decree-Law No. 185 of February 23, 1967 (Braz.), regulo.led by Decree No. 60.407 of 
March 11, 1967 (Braz.). Similar legislation has been adopted by several Brazilian states. SeeJ. 
CHACEL. et ai, supra note 27, at 73-80. 
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One exception is a unique statute adopted in 1976 by Argentina requiring 
that all debts discharged under the aegis of the bankruptcy courts be mone-
tarily corrected by coefficients from the wholesale price index for 
nonagricultural products. 35 Another is a sizeable group of statutes requiring 
monetary correction of specially regulated contractual obligations, such as 
leases subject to rent controp6 or collective wage agreements. 
Thus, the legislatures of these countries generally left to the courts the task 
of revising or abrogating contracts which have become unduly onerous 
because of unanticipated inflation. The courts have intervened in this area 
sparingly. Almost always, the doctrinal device utilized has been the theory of 
imprevlslOn. 
A. The Theory of Imprevision 
The origins of the theory of imprevision go back to Roman law and the 
medieval doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, which posits that every contract contains 
a tacit clause (or implicit condition subsequent) ending or modifying its 
obligatory force whenever there has been such a substantial change in the state 
of facts prevailing at the date the contract was made as to render its perform-
ance unjust. This theory was espoused by the canonists of the 12th and 13th 
centuries and applied by the ecclesiastical courts, who smelled usury whenever 
one party's bargain seemed overly generous. It was elaborated by the post-
Glossators and incorporated into Italian and German doctrine until the 18th 
century, when it was consigned to the doctrinal scrap heap because of its threat 
to the security of commercial transactionsY In the face of the economic dise-
quilibria resulting from World War I, many European jurists sought 
theoretical justifications for excusing promisors from contracts whose per-
formance had become exceedingly burdensome. They reclaimed rebus sic stan-
tibus and recycled it under a variety of names, each with a slightly different 
nuance. 38 
35. Law No. 21.488 of December 30,1976, arts. 1-2 (Argen.). This statute avoids the unjust 
result of treating as equals creditors who have been owed the same nominal sum by the bankrupt 
for varying lengths of time. It also reduced the attractiveness to debtors with substantial non-cash 
assets of lightening their debts by seeking compositions or arrangements in the bankruptcy 
courts. 
36. E.g., Law No. 20.625 of Jan. 21, 1974 (Argen.), replaced by Law No. 21.342 of June 30, 
1976 (Argen.); Law No. 4.494 of Nov. 25, 1964 (Braz.), as modified by Decree-Law No.6 of Apr. 
14, 1966 (Braz.); Law No. 5.334 of Oct. 12, 1967 (Braz.); Law No. 6.146 of Nov. 29, 1974 
(Braz.); and Law No. 6.423 of June 17, 1977 (Braz.); Law No. 17.600 of Jan. 17, 1972 (Chile); 
Law No. 13.292 of Oct. 1964 (Uruguay); and Law No. 14.219 of July 4, 1974 (Uruguay). The 
Brazilian experience in indexing rent control statutes is analyzed in Rosenn, Controlled Rents, supra 
note 29. 
37. See 6 M. PLAINOL & G. RIPERT, TRIATE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 526-27 (2d 
ed. P. Esmein 1952) [hereinafter cited as PLAINOL & RIPERT); A. MEDEIROS DA FONSECA,CASO 
FORTUITO E TEORIA DA IMPREVISAo 198-200 (3d ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as A. MADEIROS DA 
FONSECA). 
38. French, Italian, and Polish law have developed the theorie de l'imprivision. German and 
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There is no single definition of the theory of imprevision, but its core con-
cept is that a court may annul or revise a contract whenever there has been a 
substantial and unforeseen change in the economic conditions prevailing at 
the time the contract was made, rendering performance by the obligor 
exceedingly onerous, though not objectively impossible.39 The doctrine ten-
tatively crept into Brazilian law through doctrine and judicial decisions in the 
1930s to permit escape from contractual obligations which had become unduly 
burdensome because of deflation and the economic dislocation associated with 
the Great Depression. 40 During the 1940s, when construction prices soared 
because of wartime shortages and inflation, a number of Brazilian courts per-
mitted revision or termination of unduly burdensome contracts,41 despite the 
explicit language of Article 1246 of the Civil Code apparently prohibiting such 
relief. 42 But since the 1950s Brazilian case law has tended to accept the doc-
trine of imprevision in theory but deny its application to contracts which have 
become unduly onerous because of unanticipated inflation. 43 After so many 
years of chronic inflation, the Brazilian courts have developed a deaf ear to the 
Swiss law have developed Ihe doctrines of Geschaftsgrundlage, economic ruin, equivalence of per-
formance, and good faith. The Scandinavian countries expanded the concept of physical im-
possibility to include economic impossibility. See generally A. MEDEIROS DA FONSECA, supra note 
37; Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 287 
(1958); Rodhe, Atijustment of Contracts on Account of Changed Conditions, 3 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 
151 (1959). 
39. See A. MEDEIROSDA FONSECA, supra note 37, at 200-45. A. COUSTASSEDELC. & F. ITURRA 
A., EL CASO FORTUITO ANTE EL DERECHO CIVIL 120-21 (1958). 
40. The first Brazilian case to apply the theory of imprevision was Carlos Conteville & Cia. v. 
Maison F. Elio & Cia.; S.A., 100 Revista de Direito [Rev. Dir.) 178 (1930), aff'd, 77 Revista 
Forense [Rev. For.) 79 (Sup. Fed. Trib. 1938). See generally A. MEDEIROS DA FONSECA, supra note 
37, at 310-20. 
41. E.g., Santos Filho & Cia. v. Rodrigues Taveres, 151 Revista dos Tribunais [Rev. Trib.) 
712,68 ArchivoJudiciario [Arch. Jud.)344 (5th Cam Civ. Fed. Dis. 1943); Durante v. Teixeira, 
166 Rev. Trib. 786, 104 Rev. For. 269 (3d Cam Civ. Ct. App. Fed. Dis. 1945). But see Processo 
M.T.I.C.N. 231.800-44, 2 Revista de Direito Administrativo [Rev. Dir. Admin.) 812 (Fasc. II 
1945). 
42. Article 1246 provides: 
The architect or builder who contracts to build in accordance with plans accepted by the 
owner, shall not have the right to demand an increment in the price, even if salaries or 
materials become more expensive, or Ihere has been an alteration or increase in the 
amount of work specified in the plans, unless such increment or alteration is done in ac-
cordance with written instructions from the owner and exhibited by the architect or 
builder. 
C6DIGO CIVIL art. 1246 (Braz.) (translation by the author). 
43. Constructor Imobliaria Comercial S.A. v. Orlando Fran"a et aI., 36 Revista Trimestral de 
Jurisprudencia [R.T.].) 104 (3d Term Sup. Fed. Trib. 1965); Beckhauser, et ux v. Pascoa Cec-
cato, 35 R.T.J. 597 (1st Sup. Fed. Trib. 1965); ECAL v. Araujo Pereira, 4 Revista de 
Jurisprudencia do Tribunal de Justi"a do Estado de Guanabara [Rev. Juris. Guan.) 208 (5th 
Cam. Civ., No. 10, 1964); Banco Americano de Cn!dito S.A. v. Espolio de Pinto de Macedo, 5 
Rev. Juris. Guan. 183 (3d Group Cam. Civ., No. 13, 1965); Auerback v. Coelho Pinto, 210 
Rev. For. 145 (5th Cam. Civ. Guan. 1961); Lustman v. da Costa Barros, 41 R.T.]. 725 (1st 
Term Sup. Fed. Trib. 1967). 
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claim that inflation was unforeseeable. Only in the area of public construction 
contracts have the Brazilian courts continued to revise contracts on the theory 
of imprevision, +4 returning to the French administrative law origins of the 
doctrine.·5 But the enactment of federal and state legislation automatically in-
dexing public works contracts has largely obviated any need for judicial revi-
sion in this area.·6 
Early attempts during the 1920s and 1930s to persuade the Argentine courts 
to accept the theory of imprevision were firmly rebuffed as lacking any support 
in positive lawY However, after the inflation rate exceeded 30 percent for 
three consecutive years, as occurred in 1950-1952, Argentine courts began 
bailing out improvident contractors by reading the theory of imprevision into 
Argentine law.·8 This interpretational venture derived wide support from the 
doctrine.·9 When the Argentine Civil Code was reformed in 1968, Article 
1198 was amended to include the following provision, taken from Article 1467 
of the Italian Civil Code: 
If, in ... contracts with deferred or continued performance, the 
performance of one of the parties becomes excessively onerous 
because of extraordinary and unforeseeable events, the prejudiced 
party may demand the termination of the contract. The same princi-
ple shall apply to aleatory contracts when excessive onerousness 
results from causes extraneous to the very risk of a contract. 
In contracts of continued performance termination shall not affect 
that which has already been performed. 
Termination shall not be granted if the prejudiced party has been 
at fault or in delay. 
The other party may prevent termination by offering to improve 
the effects of the contract in an equitable fashion. 50 
44. E.g., Prefeitura Municipal de Santos v. Daniel Domingos & Irmaos, Ltda., 41 R.T.]. 709 
(3d Term Sup. Fed. Trib. 1966). 
45. The theory of imprevision in France developed in administrative law and has been con-
fined to three types of contracts: (1) public works; (2) governmental supplies; and (3) public util-
ity concessions. A. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 712 (1st ed. 1957). Attempts to ex-
pand the doctrine to contracts governed by the civil law have been regularly frustrated by the 
Cour de Cassation. 6 PLAINOL & RIPERT, supra note 37, at 532-33; Noirel, L'Influence tk la 
Dipriciation Monitaire dans les Contracts tk Droit Privi, in INFLUENCE DE LA DEPRECIATION 
MONETAIRE SUR LA VIE]URIDlQUE PRIVEE 100-01 (P. Durand ed. 1961). 
46. See note 34 supra. 
47. Ponzano v. Banco El Hogar Argentino, 29 ]urisprudencia Argentina LJ.A.] 576 (App. 
Rosario 1929); Piran de Flores v. Dose y Cia., 9 Revista]uridica Argentina - La Ley [La Ley] 
576 (1st Cam. Civ. B.A. 1937). 
48. Grau Bassas v. Fernandez, 1952-IV].A. 381 (2d Cam. Civ. y Com. Eva Peron 1952); 
Cabal v. Madero, 75 La Ley 254 (CN Civ., sala C 1953). But see Staudt y Cia. v. Padua, 1953-IV 
].A. 30 (App. Parana 1953), criticized in a note by Spota, but aff'd, 75 La Ley 411 (Sup. Ct. 
1954). For subsequent cases accepting imprevision in the early 1960s, see cases cited at 1 G. BOR· 
DA, OBLIGACIONES 136 n.312 (4th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as G. BORDA]. 
49. The authors are collected in 1 G. BORDA, supra note 48, at 137 n.313. 
50. Law 17.711 of April 22, 1968 (Argen.). 
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Even though the theory of imprevision has been enacted into positive law, in 
recent years Argentine courts, like their Brazilian counterparts, have been 
reluctant to utilize this doctrine to relieve contracting parties, taking the posi-
tion that inflation is a notorious fact of life in Argentina. 51 But the sharp up-
ward surge in the inflation rate between 1974, when the consumer price index 
rose by only 24.2 percent, and 1975 and 1976, when the index soared by 182.7 
percent and 444.3 percent respectively, has led to occasional decisions reliev-
ing an obligor because of the imprevisibility of that much inflation. 52 
Despite the high rates of inflation in Chile and Uruguay, the theory of im-
prevision does not appear to have been accepted by the courts or legislators. 53 
There are good reasons for judicial reluctance to embrace the theory of im-
prevision. At the heart of this doctrine is the notion of unforeseeability. But in 
countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, inflation is hardly un-
foreseeable. What is unforeseeable is monetary stability! Thus, the nature of 
the judicial inquiry really becomes whether the rate of inflation actually ex-
perienced substantially exceeded the range of inflation which reasonably 
might have been contemplated by the parties. This kind of inquiry is doubly 
difficult because, as Professor Alan Schwartz has astutely observed: 
The price reflects the aggregate expectations of market par-
ticipants, but the litigating parties may have different subjective 
views as to the expected fluctuation range. This may not be unusual 
in markets where speculation is frequent, as people apparently 
speculate because they hold unrepresentative beliefs as to future 
prices .... Thus, a court may sometimes have to find two expected 
price fluctuation curves, not one. 54 
Changes in the prices of commodities and services are typical business risks. 
A primary purpose of contract law is to permit the parties to fix that risk. 
There is really no feasible way for the courts to differentiate between price 
changes resulting from fluctuations in the value of goods and services and 
those resulting from changes in the value of money, which depends on the 
quantities of goods and services which one can purchase with it. To revise con-
tracts on the theory of imprevision in a highly inflationary economy a court 
must make such complex economic judgments that the outcome becomes quite 
51. Tomelleri v. Munia (Cnac. Civ. 11/15177), J.A., July 5, 1978, at 22; Erifa, S.C.A. v. 
Waterling, S.R.L. (Cam. Esp. Civ. y Com., sala 5, 6/30178), La Ley, Sept. 20, 1978, at 5; 
Chisari, Santos R. v. Vacani, Armando y otros, 1976-IIJ.A. 3 (Cnac. Civ., sala D, 1975). 
52. Aycor S.A. v. Parrone, Atilio y otra, 1977-111 J.A. 618 (Cnac. Civ., sala C, 1977) and 
cases cited in Bianchi, Sobre Inflacitin e Imprevisitin, 1977-IIIJ.A. 619, 620 n.3. 
53. Sebastian Bidegain Sachetti v. Instituto Nacional de Viviendas Economicas, 73 La 
Justicia Uruguaya LJust. Urug.) 8410 (Trib. Apel. Civ. 1st Sess. 1975) (denying the applicability 
of imprevision in Uruguayan law). Research has disclosed no Chilean cases accepting the doc-
trine of imprevision. 
54. Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 So. CALIF. L. REV. I, 13 n.30 (1976). 
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unpredictable. The resulting uncertainty makes economic planning difficult, 
promotes litigation and seriously undermines the public interest in the security 
of transactions. 
Moreover, to the extent that the courts are willing to intercede readily to 
relieve contracting parties of hardship created by unanticipated inflation, the 
parties are relieved of pressure to allocate the risk of inflation on their own. It 
is far preferable for the parties specifically to allocate the risk of inflation than 
for the courts at some later date to guess about how the parties would have 
allocated the risk. As a practical matter, what has happened in these Latin 
American countries is that almost everyone contracting for future perform-
ance either includes some form of protective clause or allocates the inflation 
risk through the price or the interest rate. This development is described 
below. 
B. The Growth of Consensual Indexation 
Over the years lawyers have developed a variety of techniques for protecting 
the economic value of contracts from inflation. These techniques range in 
sophistication from simply avoiding contracts which call for future perform-
ance for a fixed price to automatic index adjustments with complex 
mathematical formulae. Though ultimately all stabilization clauses can be 
regarded as commodity clauses, in that they tie the underlying value of an 
obligation to the price of a single commodity or a group of commodities, for 
analytical purposes it is helpful to distinguish among four basic types of 
stabilization clauses: (1) commodity clauses; (2) gold clauses; (3) foreign 
money clauses; and (4) index clauses. 
1. Commodity Clauses 
The simplest technique for insulating an agreement from the operation of 
the nominalist principle is to use a commodity as both a measure of value and 
a means of payment. For example, a landowner may rent a field to a farmer in 
exchange for one-half the crop or for a determined amount of wheat. 
Pure commodity clauses have been upheld universally. They are, however, 
only crude maintenance-of-value devices, for the price of any given commod-
ity may be subject to volatile fluctuations which have nothing to do with the in-
flation rate. Moreover, contracting parties ordinarily do not wish to be paid in 
a particular commodity. 
Since most people prefer the convenience of being paid in money, the com-
modity-index clause, a variant on the pure commodity clause, has evolved. 
The commodity-index clause uses the price of a commodity or group of com-
modities only as a measure of value; currency is the means of payment. For 
example, in 1953 Chile authorized the Banco del Estado de Chile to issue 
readjustable bonds paying up to 6 Y2 percent annual interest with principal in-
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dexed to the price of wheat or concrete. 55 But with the exception of one issue, 
authorized in 1956 to finance a potable water project and indexed to the price 
of wheat, this type of bond has not been used. 56 The difficulty with 
commodity-indexed bonds is that the purchaser must bear the risk that the 
price of the commodity to which his bond is linked will lag behind the general 
price level. The risk is significantly exacerbated in countries like Chile, where 
price controls have been as familiar a sight on the economic landscape as infla~ 
tion itself. 57 
Commodity-index stabilization clauses present legal problems similar to in-
dex clauses. These problems will be taken up infra in the section dealing with 
index clauses. 
2. Gold Clauses 
Since people historically have regarded the value of money as the amount of 
precious metal for which it could be exchanged or which it contained, the most 
common form of stabilization clause until the 1930s was the gold clause. There 
are several varieties of gold clauses, but their ultimate purpose are the same: to 
assure the creditor that he would be no poorer in terms of gold at the time of 
payment because of any decline in the purchasing power of money. 
Since the enactment of legislation making nonconvertible paper money 
legal tender, gold clauses have been regarded with considerable hostility by 
courts in many countries. Particularly influential have been French doctrine 
and case law holding that gold clauses are implicitly invalidated by the prin-
ciples of nominalism and cours force' (domestically nonconvertible legal 
tender).58 The issue was hotly debated for many years in Argentina, and a 
number of cases, including a decision of the Supreme Court, declared gold 
clauses unenforceable because of legal tender legislation. 59 But the more recent 
cases and doctrine have rejected the French approach, and it now seems 
reasonably clear that gold clauses are permissible in Argentina. 60 Uruguayan 
cases and doctrine long maintained that gold clauses were barred by the impli-
cation of Law 5150 of August 1914, which expressly prohibits all payments in 
gold.61 This line of cases was expressly overturned by a 1976 statute which 
55. Chilean D.F.L. No. 357 of July 25, 1953. 
56. Moreno, Sistemas Legales de Reajustes en los Valores Monetarios, Revista de Derecho Economico 
[Rev. Der. Econ.JJan.-Mar.lApril-June 1964, at 57, 64. 
57. See Furnish, Chilean Antitrust Law, 19 AM.J. COMPo L. 464 (1971). 
58. A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 263-66; F. MANN, supra note 14, at 151-53. 
59. Bustillo V. Cafe Paulista, 1953-IIIJ.A. 89, 70 La Ley 399 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Set also L. GUR-
FINKEL DE WENDY, supra note 27, at 164-71. 
60. Bentivoglio v. Arana de Jordan, L.I., 1967-VIJ.A. 528, 129 La Ley 799 (Sup. Ct. B.A. 
1967); Gaustavino, El Derecho Civil ante La Injlacion, 116 La Ley 1080, 1093-94 (1964). 
61. D. FERRERE-LAMAISON, supra note 27, at 77-79; 1 J. GAMARRA, TRATADO DE DERECHO 
CIVIL URUGUAYO 159 (2d ed. 1969). 
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provides, in pertinent part: "The parties can establish whatever type of 
stipulation for the purpose of maintaining the value of their contractual obliga-
tions.' '62 Though the Chilean Supreme Court twice upheld the validity of gold 
clauses after 1932, when legislation making paper money nonconvertible into 
gold was enacted,63 subsequent decisions of that tribunal have declared gold 
clauses unenforceable because of such legislation. 64 Following the example of 
the United States, Brazil in 1933 adopted a decree abrogating all gold 
clauses;65 however, unlike the United States,66 the Brazilians have not seen fit 
to repeal this legislation. 
International monetary events have made gold clauses anachronisms. To-
day no currency is freely convertible into gold. Any theoretical linkage be-
tween the world's currencies and gold was formally abolished by the Second 
Amendment to the International Monetary Fund's Articles, which went into 
effect in 1978.61 Except for dentists, jewelers, or industrial users of gold, it no 
longer makes sense to attempt to maintain the real value of a contractual 
obligation by inserting a gold clause. Even prior to demonetization, gold had 
become a highly speculative commodity. Today its price fluctuates widely on 
international commodity markets for reasons which often are not related di-
rectly to the real purchasing power of national currency units. 
3. Foreign Currency Clauses 
Another common stabilization device is the foreign currency clause. The 
foreign currency, which is generally a so-called "hard currency" (relatively 
stable), may serve as the unit of payment or solely as the unit of account. For 
example, an Argentine lease might require payment of a monthly rent of U.S. 
$1,000. Alternatively, the rental might be fixed at U.S. $1,000 per month, 
payable in Argentine pesos at the official exchange rate in effect on the first 
day of each month. 
62. Law No. 14.500 of Feb. 25, 1976, art. 9 (Uruguay). 
63. Mujica v. Vergara, 35 Revista de Derecho, Jurisprudencia y Ciencias Sociales y Gaceta 
de los Tribunales [R.D.] .]318 (2d Part, 1st Sec. 1938); Direccion General de Impuestos Internos 
v. Corte, 36 R.D.]. 426 (2d Part, 1st Sec. 1939). 
64. Compania Chilena de Electricidad v. Ferrocarriles del Estado, 46 R.D.]. 917 (2d Part, 1st 
Sec. 1949); Fisco v. Compania de Telefonos de Chile, 45 R.D.]. 644 (2d Part, 1st Sec. 1948); see 
also Varela Varela, Discurso, in EL DERECHO ANTE LA INFLACION 25,29 (Primer Congreso Na-
cional de Abogados Chilenos, 1954); Lira Urquieta, El Codigo Civil y la Inflacion, in EL DERECHO 
ANTE LA INFLACI6N 152, 155 (Primer Congreso Nacional de Abogados Chilenos, 1954). Pres-
ently, gold clauses would seem to be banned by Decree-Law No. 455 of May 25, 1974, arts. 17, 
19 (Chile), with respect to credit transactions, unless special permission is obtained from the Cen-
tral Bank. 
65. Decree No. 23.501 of Nov. 27, 1933 (Braz.) 
66. Pub. L. No. 95-147, § 4(c), 91 Stat. 1299 (1977), repealing the U.S. Joint Resolution with 
respect to obligations issued on or after October 28, 1977. 
67. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 56 (1978). 
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Argentina and Chile have permitted the use of foreign currency clauses. 
The case law has insisted, however, that except for international transactions, 
the foreign currency serve only as a unit of account; the unit of payment must 
be national currency.68 Until 1976 Uruguayan courts regularly nullified 
foreign currency clauses in domestic contracts as incompatible with the legal 
tender legislation. 69 This line of cases was legislatively overruled in 1976 by 
Law No. 14.500, which expressly permits foreign currency clauses regardless 
of whether the foreign currency is the unit of account or the unit of payment. 70 
Brazilian law, on the other hand, continues to regard as null and void all 
foreign currency clauses except for: (a) import or export contracts; (b) financ-
ing agreements for the export of Brazilian goods; (c) contracts for the buying 
and selling of foreign exchange; and (d) contracts where the debtor and the 
creditor are neither Brazilian citizens or domiciliaries, unless the contract in-
volves the lease of real property situated in Brazil. 71 
Foreign currency clauses are useful techniques for shifting exchange risks in 
international transactions, but they are far from ideal devices for protecting 
parties from the risks of inflation in domestic contracts. Though the dollar 
may appear to be stable to a landlord in Argentina, whose peso has declined 
enormously vis-a:vis the dollar in the last six years, the purchasing power of the 
dollar has itself declined by approximately 50 percent between 1971 and 1977. 
The foreign currency clause offers no protection against inflation in the so-
called "hard currency." Moreover, in the short-run at least, countries 
undergoing severe inflation often delay devaluation or devalue by far less than 
inflation rate differentials would suggest as proper. 72 When this happens, as it 
commonly does in Latin America, creditors who rely on foreign currency 
68. Atlas S.A. v. Valentine, 105 La Ley 691 (CN Com., Sala C, Arg. 1961); Schwarz v. Cor-
tazar, 60 R.D.]. 169 (2d Part, 2d Sec., C. Santiago, Chile 1963). 
69. The cases are collected and criticized in Capurro Calamet, Algo Mas sobre la Pretendida 
Vigencia del Curso Forzoso y el Problema de la Eficacia Juridica de las Obligaciones Intemas Pactadas en 
Moneda Extranera, 64 Revista de Derecho, Jurisprudencia y Administracicin [Rev. D.].A.) 1 
(1967); see also Caggiani, Alcone y Validez des las Cltiusulas Monetarias seglin Nuestro Derecho Positivo, 64 
Rev. D.] .A. 26 (1967); Quijano, La Cltiusula Oro 0 en Moneda Extra,yerafrente a la Ley del 18 de Ereno 
de 1938, Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Administracicin [Rev. Fac. Ciencias 
Econ. y. Admin.) 316 (No.2, 1940). 
Foreign currency loans, however, were expressly permitted by statute for loans made through 
the Central Bank with the proceeds of foreign borrowing for economic development purposes. D. 
FERRERE-LAMAISON. supra note 27, at 96-100. 
70. Law No. 14.500 of Feb. 25, 1976, art. 10 (Uruguay). However, the Uruguayan courts 
have refused to apply Law No. 14.500 retroactively. E.S.A. v. A.B., 76Just. Urug. 8719 (Trib. 
Appl. Civ., lst Sess. 1977). 
71. Decree Law No. 23.501 of Nov. 27, 1933 (Braz.), as amended by Law No. 28 of Feb. 15, 
1935 (Braz.); Decree No. 6.650 of June 29, 1944 (Braz.); and Decree-Law No. 857 of Sept. 11, 
1969 (Braz.). 
72. Stt generally G. HALM. MONETARY THEORY 221-28 (1946). Brazil has frequently main-
tained an overvalued exchange rate. Set Cline, Brazil's Emerging International Economic Role, in 
BRAZIL IN THE SEVENTIES 63, 68-70 (R. Roett ed. 1976). 
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clauses for protection are bound to be at least partially disappointed. Finally, 
they create problems of interpretation when, as occasionally happens in Latin 
America, multiple exchange rates are in effect. 
4. Index Clauses 
The most effective way for contracting parties to protect themselves against 
inflation is by linking the value of their bargain to a broadly-based price index, 
such as the consumer price index, wholesale price index, or implicit GNP 
deflator. 73 Because such indexes are yardsticks of the purchasing power of na-
tional currency, they are tailored far better to inflation-proofing contracts than 
commodity, gold, or foreign currency clauses. A number of courts and com-
mentators also have voiced hostility to permitting the use of index clauses. The 
legal reasons advanced for striking down index clauses generally are perceived 
conflicts with legal tender legislation, the nominalist principle, or public 
policy.74 But the underlying reasons would appear to be the fear that index 
clauses exacerbate inflationary pressures, impose inequitable burdens on cer-
tain debtors, and unfairly allow a few privileged persons to escape the implicit 
tax levied upon society through the mechanism of inflation. 75 Despite their 
present popularity in these Latin American countries, index clauses have had 
to overcome a number of juridical obstacles. 
Brazilians have had to contend with doctrine and case law invalidating in-
dex clauses because of the broad language used in the gold clause legislation. 
Decree No. 23.501 of November 27, 1933, which is still in force, not only 
abrogates all gold clauses, but goes on to nullify every contract to be per-
formed in Brazil "that stipulates payment in money other than by its current 
legal value. "76 This ambiguous language caused some Brazilian jurists to 
declare that index clauses were forbidden unless specifically authorized by the 
legislature. 77 Because of lingering doubts about the validity of index clauses, 
73. Rosenn, Protecting Contracts from Inflation, 33 Bus. LAW. 729 (1978). A brief, readable ex-
planation of the construction and qualities of these indexes is contained in W. W ALI.ACE. 
MEASURING PRICE CHANGES: A STUDY OF THE PRICE INDEXES (2d ed. 1972). 
74. The source of much of this doctrinal absurdity has been France. The literature describing 
the doctrinal knots in which the French have tied themselves on this issue is immense. Useful 
treatments in English are Levy, "Sliding Scak" or "Indexation" Clauses in French Law, 16 AM. U. L. 
REV. 35 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Levy]; Hauser, The Use of Index Clauses in Private Loans, 7 AM. 
J. COMPo L. 350 (1958); Vasseur, French Monetary Depreciation and Methods Used to Remedy It, 30 
TuL. L. REV. 73 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Vasseur]. 
75. See Vassuer, supra note. 74; see also, Levy, supra note 74, at 38-49 for a description of the 
variety of legal arguments and counterarguments articulated in French doctrine and cases. 
76. See note 65 supra. 
77. E.g., Caio Mario da Silva Pereira, Estabkcimmto de Clausula de Escala Movel nas ObrigarjJes em 
Dinheiro, 234 Rev. Trib. 3, 157 Rev. For. 50 (1955); San Tiago Dantas, cited in A. WALD. supra 
note 16, at 160-61; Draft Code of Obligations of 1965, art. 144. 
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the military government which came to power in Brazil in 1964 felt it 
necessary to enact numerous statutes specifically authorizing the use of index-
ation in certain types of transactions and under certain conditions. 78 Since 
there has never been an across-the-board authorization of indexation in all 
contracts, Brazilians long have harbored doubts about the legality of index 
clauses not specifically authorized by statute. In recent years, however, the 
case law has taken the position that all index clauses are valid unless they con-
flict with a specific legislative norm.79 
Though French doctrine and case law with respect to nominalism and cours 
force initially generated some doubts, the Argentines, Chileans, and 
Uruguayans long have regarded index clauses as valid and have employed 
them widely. 80 
Another legal hurdle for index clauses has been usury laws. If the adjust-
ment resulting from indexation is considered interest rather than return of 
principal, index clauses in loans are likely to be deemed usurious even with 
relatively mild rates of inflation. Since the nominalist principle conclusively 
presumes that money is always equal to itself, courts accustomed to thinking 
in nominalist terms are prone to consider sums from indexation as interest. 81 
Even in countries like Brazil and Chile, where indexation is widespread, the 
courts occasionally have allowed usury statutes to trap the unwary. Though in 
1966 the Chilean Supreme Court reversed the criminal conviction for usury of 
a defendant who had indexed the balance due on the sale of an apartment to 
the price of wheat, 82 in 1970 the Court of Appeals for Santiago astonishingly 
upheld the usury conviction of a moneylender whose loans, which carried a 
nonusurious nominal interest rate, were indexed to the official cost-of-living 
index. 83 In Brazil, whether the usury laws are violated has become essentially 
a matter of how one labels the transaction. So long as one is careful to use the 
78. This legislation is described in J. CHACEL, et al., supra note 27; and INDEXATION, THE 
BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE (M. Nadiri & A. Pastore eds., Occasional Papers of the Nat'l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Vol. 4, No.1, Winter 1977). 
79. J. CHACEL, et al., supra note 27, at 58-59. One example of such a norm is Law No. 5.411 of 
May 24, 1968 (Braz.), restricting increments in residential rentals from index clauses to a max-
imum of two-thirds of the percentage increase in the minimum wage. 
80. For Argentina, see F. TRIGO REPRESAS, OBLIGACIONES DE DINERO y DEPRECIACION 
MONETARIA 211 (1965); for Chile, see Vargas Vargas, Notas para un Estudio de La Clausula de 
Variacion segUn indices en el Contrato de Mutuo, in EL DERECHO ANTE LA INFLACION 159 (Primer Con-
greso Nacional de Abogados Chilenos, 1954); for Uruguay, see D. FERRERE-LAMAISON, supra note 
27, at 110. 
81. Two recent examples in the United States are Aztec Properties v. Union Planters Nat'l 
Bank, 530 S.W. 2d 756 (Tenn. 1975), urt. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976); and Olwine v. Torrens, 
236 Pa. Super. 51, 344 A.2d 665 (1975). 
82. Salas v. Miguel, 63 R.D.]. 141 (2d Part, 4th Sec. 1966). This case is discussed in Fueyo 
Laneri, La Actualizacion 0 Reajustabilidad del Valor de la Deuda Dineraria, como Requisito del Pago Ejec-
tivo, Cualquiera Que Sea La Fuente de la Obligacion, Rev. de Ciencias Penales 3, 11-12 (1974), translated 
in K. KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 454 (1975). 
83. Wagemann Ehrenfeld, Julio, 67 R.D.]. 42 (2d Part, 4th Sec. 1970). 
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term monetary correction or commission rather than interest to denominate 
payments for the use of money, Brazilian courts are willing to tolerate the cir-
cumvention of the usury laws. 84 Indeed, it is common for lenders to 
denominate sums as "prefixed monetary correction" to circumvent the usury 
laws. 85 But if a lender is naive enough to call the additional sums interest, the 
Brazilian courts have tended to enforce the 12 percent a year usury limitation 
in purely nominalist terms. 86 Chile has obviated this usury problem by defin-
ing interest in valoristic terms. A 1974 statute specifically provides that 
nominal increases in loan payments because of increases in the consumer price 
index are not interest for any legal purpose. 87 
Though index clauses now are permitted in all four of these South American 
countries, Brazil and Chile recently have imposed certain restrictions on their 
use. Concern about the inflationary feedback from its comprehensive system 
of monetary correction led Brazil to enact a law in 1977 which limits indexa-
tion of virtually all pecuniary obligations to the type of readjustment 
calculated by the government for Readjustable Treasury Bonds.88 Though 
readjustment of these bonds is supposed to be based upon variations in the 
wholesale price index, in recent years the government has expurgated and 
manipulated the adjustment mechanism so that the rate of increase in these 
bonds has been several percentage points below that of the wholesale price in-
dex. 89 In 1974 Chile enacted a statute that is Janus-faced with respect to index-
ation. 90 First, it repeals Article 2199 of the Chilean Civil Code, which had ex-
plicitly adopted nominalism but had expressly permitted index clauses. 91 Sec-
84. B. Prates & Cia. Ltda. v. Toyota do Brasil S.A., R.E. No. 64.473, 53 R.T.]. 21 (Sup. 
Trib. Fed. en banc 1969); Wald, Da CO",q'Io Monettiria dos Dibitos Comerciais PIa Jurisprudincia, 
Revista dos Tribunais Informa [RT Informa], Jan. 30, 1971, at 17. 
85. Rosenn, Adaptions of th, Brazilian Income Tax to Inflation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 58, 96 (1968). 
The total interest and estimated monetary correction are fixed in advance, but no attempt is 
made to separate interest from monetary correction until the official calculation of the Read-
justable Treasury Bonds is made. At the time any amount in excess of the officially recognized 
amount of monetary correction is denominated interest and the rest is considered tax-exempt and 
usury-exempt monetary correction. 
86. Figueiredo v. Gutierre, R.E. No. 58.414,36 R.T.]. 46 (Sup. Fed. Trib., 1st Term, 1965); 
Albino da Cruz Ferro, R.E. No. 65.424, 47 R.T.]. 558 (Sup. Fed. Trib., 1st Term 1968). 
87. Decree-Law No. 455 of May 25, 1974, art. 4 (Chile). 
88. Law No. 6.423 of June 17, 1977 (Braz.). This statute excepts only contracts for the future 
delivery of goods or services and certain contracts already in force. 
89. Between 1974 and 1976 the value of Readjustable Treasury Bonds increased by 30.1 per-
cent, while the wholesale price index increased by 41.3 percent. During the first quarter of 1977 
Readjustable Treasury Bonds increased by 6.1 percent, while the wholesale price increased by 
13.4 percent. Calculated from data appearing in Conj. Econ., May 1977, at 153, 169. The evolu-
tion of the formula for the calculation of monetary correction for Readjustable Treasury Bonds is 
shown in CO",(ao Monettiria , RealimenltJcj.io Injlacioruiria, Conj. Econ., June 1976, at 88, 92-94; and 
Com(ao Monettiria das O.R. T.N.-Formas de Ctilculo, Conj. Econ., Dec. 1974, at 92; see also note 29, 
supra. 
90. Decree-Law No. 455 of May 25, 1974 (Chile). 
91. /d., art. 25. 
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ond, it prohibits indexation of all credit transactions with a term of one year or 
less, forcing the creditor to rely solely on the interest rate to protect himself 
against inflation. Third, it frees interest rates from nominalist usury con-
straints by defining interest so as to exclude any sums resulting from indexa-
tion, at least to the extent of the variation in the official consumer price 
index. 92 Fourth, the law automatically indexes all credit transactions in 
Chilean currency with a term of more than one year to the consumer price in-
dex unless the parties expressly stipulate to the contrary or secure Central 
Bank permission to use an alternative index. 93 Fifth, it modifies the Commer-
cial Code to permit negotiable instruments to contain index clauses. 94 
Indexation has become a vital mechanism in restoring the medium and 
long-term credit markets, which had largely disappeared in these countries 
because of inflation. In Argentina and Brazil indexed government securities 
have become very important financial instruments. 95 However, there has not 
been a corresponding development in private corporate offerings of indexed 
securities. 96 In all of these countries, there are extensive systems of indexed 
savings deposits and correspondingly indexed mortgages. 97 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all credit transactions are in-
dexed. Many businessmen are unhappy about not knowing what their actual 
cost of credit will be in advance. In all of these countries there are large 
numbers of credit transactions, generally short-term, that remain unindexed, 
or employ what the Brazilians call "prefixed monetary correction. "98 
IV. DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF OBLIGATIONS 
Chronic inflation can play havoc with damages awarded by courts for 
breach of contract or torts. The nominalist principle, fixed legal interest rates, 
and currency depreciation - operating in tandem - can effectively thwart 
92. Id., art. 4. 
93. !d., art. 19. 
94. Id., arts. 26, 27. 
95. See G. JUD, supra note 28, at 104-07; Roe, Indexation of Government Bonds in Brazil: Riflections 
on the Relationship between Fixed Rules and Financial Development, 12 VAND. j. TRANSNAT'L L. -
(1979). 
96. Ness, Financial Markets Innovation as a Development Strategy: Initial Resultsfrom the Brazilian Ex-
perience, 22 ECON. DEV. & CULT. CHANGE 453, 458 (1974). 
97. The Brazilian system is described in Lefcoe, Monetary Correction and Mortgage Lending in 
Brazil: Observationsfor the United States, 21 STAN. L. REV. 106 (1968); Reynolds & Carpenter, Hous-
ing Finance in Brazil: Towards a New Distribution of Wealth, in 5 LATIN AM. URB. RESEARCH 147 (W. 
Cornelius & F. Trueblood eds. 1975). The Chilean program is described in Burke, Law and 
Development: The Chilean Housing Program, 2 LAW. AMERICAS 173, 353 (1970); G. JUD, supra note 
28, at 88-90. Though legislation authorizing readjustable savings deposits and mortgages was 
enacted in Argentina during the 1960s, the system only recently has become widely used. See 
Resolution No. 21 of the Caja Federal de Ahorro y Prestamo para la Vivienda of Dec. 30, 1975; 
G. JUD, supra note 28, at 106-07. Uruguay has had an indexed deposit and mortgage system since 
1969. See Robinson, Readjustable Mortgages in an lriflationary Economy - A Study of the Israeli Ex-
perience, 5 j. INT'L L. & ECON. 169, 182 (1971); D. FERRERE-LAMAISON, supra note 27, at 110-13. 
98. See note 85 supra. 
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the basic purpose of compensation, restoration of the status quo ante to the ex-
tent monetarily possible. 
Inflation erodes the value of monetary damages in several ways. Where 
damages are liquidated or calculated as of the date of breach or the tort, infla-
tion between that date and the date of judgment will substantially reduce the 
value of the award, unless interest is awarded at a rate which exceeds inflation. 
If there is a significant lapse of time between judgment and payment, inflation 
will further erode the real value of the compensation awarded. This gives the 
defendant an enormous economic incentive to delay the proceedings as much 
as possible. The problem of inflationary erosion is even more pronounced with 
respect to damages for future injuries, such as lost earnings or profits. To the 
extent that courts fix such sums in terms of present values, inflation will 
quickly render the award inadequate. This is particularly striking in countries 
like Brazil and Chile, which compensate tort victims for lost future earnings 
with a pension instead of a lump sum award. 
Consider the facts of the Chilean case of Guzman v. Empresa de los Ferrocarriles 
del Estado. 99 In 1959 Sra. Guzman attempted to secure judicial revision of her 
monthly pension of 500 pesos, awarded in 1942 for life or until remarriage, to 
indemnify her for the wrongful death of her husband. Her pension was based 
upon her deceased husband's earnings in 1934, the date he was killed in a 
train accident. By 1942, when she finally began receiving her pension, infla-
tion already reduced its purchasing power by more than half. By 1959 her 
pension had lost 99.4 percent of its 1934 value. Though he could find no legal 
basis to revise this widow's pittance, the trial judge increased it anyway, citing 
general considerations of equity. However, the Court of Appeals reversed on 
the grounds that the judgment violated the principle of res judicata, and the 
Chilean Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Appeals. 100 
A. The Award of Indexed Pensions 
Brazil has resolved the inequities inherent in the Guzmizn situation by 
awarding indexed pensions. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, as infla-
tion began to gallop, Brazilian courts began to index pensions in accident 
cases to the prevailing minimum wage. The problem was particularly acute in 
Brazil because procedural law required the indemnity for lost earning capacity 
be in the form of a pension. Despite initial hostility to this innovation, after 
1963 the Supreme Federal Tribunal, Brazil's highest court, began confirming 
indexed awards. lO ! By 1969 the Supreme Federal Tribunal's decisions had 
99. 60 R.D.]. 407 (2d Part, lst Sec. 1963). 
100. 60 R.D.]. at 418-19. 
101. E.g., de Oliveira v. Rio Light S.A., R.E. No. 57.505, 45 R.T.]. 115 (2d Term 1967); 
Silva Ramos v. Ride Ferroviaria Federal S.A., 45 R.T.]. 421 (lst Term 1968). The case law 
pvolution is traced in considerable detail in]. CHACEL, et al., supra note 27, at 188-206. 
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become sufficiently uniform on the subject for the court to promulgate the 
following Sumula, or case law rule: "The pension corresponding to compensa-
tion for civil responsibility must be calculated on the basis of the minimum 
wage prevailing at the time of the judgment and shall be adjusted for subse-
quent variations. "102 In most cases Brazilian courts require the tortfeasor to 
purchase and deposit with the court government bonds with a yield sufficient 
to fund the pension. l03 The introduction of Readjustable Treasury Bonds in 
1964 has made it possible for the Brazilian courts to fund indexed pensions for 
accident victims with correspondingly indexed securities. l04 
B. Debts of Value 
An important doctrinal technique for shifting the onus of monetary 
depreciation to the tortfeasor or one who breaches another type of obligation 
has been to differentiate between debts of value (Wertschuld, divida do valor, 
deuda de valor) and pecuniary debts. A debt of value, sometimes called an 
adaptable debt,105 requires the obligor to pay an economic value rather than a 
fixed pecuniary sum. Child support and alimony are classic examples: if the 
needs of the child or spouse change, or the purchasing power of the currency 
declines, the support obligation may be revalued. In theory one distinguishes 
between debts of value and pecuniary debts by determining whether the object 
of the obligation is the payment of an essentially non-pecuniary value or the 
payment of a sum of money. If the obligation's object is the former, the debt is 
one of value and, by definition, readjustable for inflation. However, there is 
no conceptual conformity. The writers and cases diverge considerably, both as 
to which kinds of obligations should be characterized as debts of value, and as 
to whether a debt of value becomes a pecuniary debt as soon as it is liquidated 
(in a sense of being valued in currency), or remains a debt of value untiljudg-
ment, or actual payment. 106 The debt of value is essentially a doctrinal device 
102. Sumula No. 490 of Dec. 3, 1969, published in Diario da J usti~a da U niiio Federal, Dec. 10, 
1969, at 5.931 (translation by the author). 
103. C6DGIO DE PROCESSO CIVIL DE 1939, arts. 911, 912 (Braz.) as amended by Decree-Law No. 
4.565 of Aug. 11, 1942 (Braz.); C6DIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL DE 1973, art. 602 (Braz.). 
104. E.g., Via~iio Nove de Julho Ltda. v. Cromopel-Comercio e Industria de Papel e Papeliio 
S/A, A.C. No. 169.923,395 Rev. Trib. 183, 186 (1st Civ. Cam. S.P. 1968). Law No. 6.205 of 
April 29, 1975 (Braz.), prohibits the use of the minimum wage for monetary correction "for any 
legal purposes whatsoever," except for wage, social security, and fringe benefit adjustments. Ad-
justments for other purposes should be made on the basis of changes in the value of Readjustable 
Treasury Bonds. See Law No. 6.423 of June 17, 1977 (Braz.). 
105. The term Wertschuldwas invented in 1925 by Arthur Nussbaum to differentiate between 
pecuniary and value obligations. Because he felt the term "value-debt" was obscure in English, 
Professor Nussbaum decided to translate Wertschuld as "adaptable debt." A. NUSSBAUM. supra 
note 14, at 180 n.45. Debt of value seems clearer than adaptable debt, and the text proceeds on 
that basis. 
106. As Professor Gomes has so accurately stated: 
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for placing the risk of monetary depreciation on the obligor when it appears 
just to do so. During times of severe inflation there is a natural tendency on 
the part of doctrinal writers and lawyers to attempt to expand the scope of 
debts of value. Though there is little dispute among jurists who recognize the 
concept that tort and contract damages are debts of value, there is little agree-
ment as to whether such damages become pecuniary debts once liquidated. 
Severe inflation and the influence of European doctrine and case law re-
cently have led the courts of Argentina and Brazil to accept the doctrine of the 
debt of value and to shift the time for calculating damages from the date of the 
accident or breach of contract to the date of the judgment. 107 The Chilean 
courts also have changed their orientation in the past decade to permit 
monetary correction of a damage award to compensate for monetary deprecia-
tion between the date of the accident and the date of payment of the 
judgment. lOB Uruguayan lower courts and doctrinal writers have accepted the 
concept of the debt of value; 109 however, the Supreme Court has thus far sand-
bagged this breach in the dam of nominalism. 110 
The effect of the debt of value characterization is to place the onus of 
monetary depreciation on the tortfeasor or the party in default on a contrac-
tual obligation up to the moment of actual payment. If there is monetary 
depreciation between the date of judgment and actual payment, such as when 
There is no conceptual uniformity; the notion varies according to the exigencies of the 
monetary picture and ... in accordance with the criteria which the writers prefer .... 
[T]he preferable notion is that which characterizes [debts of value] as obligations whose 
object does not originally constitute a nominal sum, but depends upon the cir-
cumstances or future elements, variable and exogenous to the juridical relationship. 
However, they do not constitute a homogeneous category. Mugel has separated them 
into three groups: (1) credits of reparation; (2) credits of reimbursement; and (3) credits 
of unjust enrichment. 
O. GoMES, TRANSFORMACOES GERAIS Do DIREITO DAS OBRIGACOES 112-13 (1967). 
107. For the evolution of Argentine case law and doctrine, see E. BANCHIO, OBLIGACIONES DE 
VALOR 133-38 (1965) [hereinafter cited as E. BANCHIO]; for a resume of current Brazilian case 
law, see Wald, A Inflac.iio e as Indeniza~iJes, 233 Rev. For. 21 (1971). 
108. Cohen, Mario Cesar, 66 R.D.]. 203 (2d Part, 4th Sec. 1969); Lama, Abraham, 67 
R.D.J. 424 (2d Part, 4th Sec., Sup. Ct., Oct 16, 1970), Escobar, Angelica, 71 R.D.]. 278 (2d 
Part, 4th Sec., Sup. Ct., Oct. 8, 1974). 
109. J.A. v. Camara del Bien Rai:', 67 Just. Urug. No. 7907 Ouzgado Letrado del Trabajo de 
2d Turmo, Feb. 1, 1973); Galvan Freijo de Reyes v. Dominguez, 66 Just. Urug. No. 7890 (lst 
Instance, Aug. 26, 1971); E.F.M. v. B.F.S., 67 Just. Urug. No. 8036 (lst Instance, Apr. 24, 
1973); Carnelli, La Desvalorizacion Monetan'a en la Reparacion del Dano Extracontractual, 68 Rev. 
D.J.A. 276 (1969) and cases cited therein. 
110. Onda S.A. v. CUTCSA, 69 Just. Urug. 8171 (Sup. Ct., June 5, 1974). However, to the 
extent that the tort claim is liquidated, Law No. 14.500 of Feb. 25, 1976 (Uruguay), now pro-
vides for readjustment in accordance with the variations in the consumer price index between the 
date of the tort and the date of payment. But the Uruguayan Supreme Court has refused to apply 
this statute retroactively, tenaciously adhering to nominalist theory. Ferrari, Britos et al. v. 
Frigorifico Modelo S.A., 75 Just. Urug. No. 8623 (Sup. Ct., May 13, 1977). 
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an appeal is taken, the amount of the obligation will be revalued to reflect the 
interim diminution in value. 111 
Though it has considerable utility in securing relief from the nominalist 
principle during periods of inflation, the debt of value concept breaks down in 
two important areas: (1) pecuniary obligations; and (2) nonliquidated 
damages which are converted into pecuniary obligations by virtue of their 
payment by the plaintiff. These problems are discussed in the next section. 
C. Pecuniary Obligations 
The doctrine of the debt of value is no help to the creditor who sues for 
damages arising from failure to repay a debt on time. In this situation, the 
obligation is plainly pecuniary, and Civil Code provisions typically restrict the 
creditor's remedy to legal interest. But legal interest, which in a country like 
Brazil is set at 6 percent a year, is often decidedly negative in an inflationary 
economy. Invocation of the nominalist principle prevents the creditor from 
recovering for monetary depreciation, because such damage is presumed to be 
nonexistent. It makes sense to impose the risk of monetary depreciation on the 
creditor during the term of the loan, for it is fair to assume that he allowed for 
that risk in determining the interest rate, or could have protected himself 
against that risk by use of a stabilization clause. But it makes litde sense to 
assume that the creditor also assumed the risk of monetary depreciation 
beyond the date set for repayment,1l2 even though it is customary for commer-
cial lenders to factor in the risk of default. 
A similar problem arises with respect to the nondefaulting party who has to 
cover by purchasing goods in the open market, or the tort victim who repairs 
his car prior to suing for damages. It is hard to characterize what they are 
owed as nonpecuniary obligations, though some courts have stretched the 
elastic of the debt of value concept to include them.113 Application of the 
nominalist principle to place the burden of monetary depreciation on these in-
voluntary creditors makes no sense at all, for they clearly never assumed the 
risk of monetary depreciation and never had a chance to protect themselves 
against it. The onus appropriately belongs on the tortfeasor or the defaultor, 
111. Starting from the proposition that damage awards are debts of value, Argentine doctrine 
and case law, albeit less than unanimously, holds that a damage award does not lose its character 
as a debt of value until the moment of payment. E. BANCHIO, supra note 107, at 129-49. In Brazil 
and Chile, where the courts have been influenced by a great deal of legislation mandating 
monetary correction, damage awards are being monetarily corrected in accordance with varia-
tions in price indexes or the minimum wage between the date of judgment and the date of actual 
payment. Brazilian cases are collected in J. CHACEL, et at., supra note 27, at 176-213; Wald, 
Paraeer, 258 Rev. For. 191, 196-202 (1977). The Chilean cases are collected in Gesche Muller, 
supra note 27. 
112. Hauser, Breach of Contracts during Injlo.tion, 33 TUL. L. REV. 307,308 (1959). 
113. For a time, Argentine case law was badly divided on this precise question. The cases are 
collected in Malvar, Deudas de Valor y de Dinero. La Desvalorizaeion Monetaria y el Proceso, Oportunido.d 
paraAlegarla, 1968-VIJ.A. 138-39. 
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who otherwise profits from being able to payoff his obligation in depreciated 
currency. 
Uruguay resolved this problem by statute in 1976.11+ Since the Uruguayan 
Supreme Court has refused to recognize the concept of the debt of value to 
readjust damages for inflation, the legislature has provided that monetary 
depreciation shall be taken into account in liquidating the value of all 
pecuniary obligations whose performance is the subject of a lawsuit or arbitral 
proceeding. This is to be calculated by multiplying the amount of the obliga-
tion on the date it arises by the percentage increase in the consumer price in-
dex between that date and the date the obligation is actually paid. Interest also 
is calculated on the readjusted value. 1I5 
Spurred by the hyperinflation of 1975 and 1976 and a strong doctrinal cur-
rent,1I6 the Argentine courts recently have jettisoned nominalism on their own 
and permitted recovery for monetary depreciation when there has been delay 
in the payment of pecuniary obligations. 117 In reaching this result, the Argen-
tine courts and commentators have relied on a suggestive note by Velez 
Sarsfield, the drafter of the Civil Code, that had he been contemplating 
monetary depreciation (which he was not), he would have chosen the solution 
of the Austrian rather than the French Civil Code. 118 Initially, some of the 
commercial courts excluded overdue negotiable instruments and other com-
mercial paper from judicially imposed indexation because of a desire to main-
tain the notion that the value of the instrument be ascertainable on its face. 119 
114. Law No. 14.500 of Feb. 25, 1976 (Uruguay). 
115. /d., art. 4. 
116. E.g., Lopez Cabana, La "Indexacion" de las Deudas Dineranas, 1976-111 J .A. 788; 
Bustamante Alsina, Deudas de Dinero y Deudas de Valor. Alcanee tk la Distineion y Posibilidad tk 
Suprimirla, 149 La Ley 952 (1973); Oaria, Incumplimiento tk una Obligacion Dinerariay Depreciacion 
Monetaria, 29 J.A. 799 (1975); Borda, Las Deudas de Dinero y la DesvalorizaciOn Monetaria, La Ley 
1975-C-793; Carranza, Las Deudas Dinerariasjrente ala Desvalorizacion tk la Moneda, J.A. Doctrina 
186 (1974). 
117. Vieytes de Fernandez v. Provincia de Buenos Aires, 1976-IV J.A. 367, La Ley 
1976-0-241, (Sup. Ct., Sept. 23, 1976); Valdezv. Gobierno Nacional, La Ley 1976-0-248 (Sup. 
Ct., Sept. 23, 1976); Maturana v. Elma, La Ley 1977-C-533 (CN Fed., Apr. 22, 1977); La 
Amistad S.R.L. v. Iriarte, 1977-IV J.A. 3, La Ley 1977-0-1 (CN Com., en bane Sept. 19, 1977); 
CN Com, en bane April 13, 1977, in La Ley, Apr. 22, 1977, at 1. 
118. See note 22 supra. The Austrian Code provision referred to by Velez Sarsfield is Article 
988 of the Civil Code, which provides: 
Legal currency changes, without alteration of the internal value, are at the risk of the 
creditor. He shall accept payment in the fIXed sort of coin given by him, for example, 
tOOO imperial ducats or 3000 twenty kreuzer-pieces, without regard to whether or not 
their external value has been increased or diminished in the meantime. However, ifthe 
internal value has been altered, the payment is to be effected in proportion to the inter-
nal value which the said sort of coin had at the time the loan was contracted. 
Translaled by P. BAECK. THE GENERAL CIVIL CODE OF AUSTRIA 191-92 (1972). 
119. Chiarmonte, La DepreciaciOn Monetaria en los TI~ulos tk Cridito y en el Proceso Ejecutivo, La Ley 
1978-A-267. 
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But a very recent en bane decision has abandoned this distinction and has re-
quired indexation of all unpaid pecuniary obligations. l2O 
Although the question is not free from doubt, Chile would appear also to 
have rejected the nominalism of its Civil Code and to permit recovery for 
monetary depreciation for delay in the payment of pecuniary obligations. 121 
The Brazilian courts, on the other hand, generally have adhered to 
nominalism with respect to pecuniary obligations,122 though there are very re-
cent indications that this orientation may be changing. 123 
V. CONCLUSION 
Chronic inflation has forced Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay to 
abandon nominalism and embrace valorism in a number of crucial areas of 
their legal systems. In Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser extent Chile, the 
courts have played a leading role in adapting legal institutions to inflation to 
120. Papelera Alsina S.A. v. Arnedo, Jose A., La Ley 1978-A-267 (CN Com, en bane, Dec. 22, 
1977). 
121. There have been few reported Chilean cases dealing with this problem. In Enrique Perez 
Moscoso v. Pablo Valdes Ossa, 62 R.D.]. 9 (2d Part, 3d Sec., Sup. Ct., April 2, 1965), the 
Labor Court of Santiago monetarily corrected the damages owed an employee for breach of a 
labor contract because the unpaid salary had an alimentary character, a result confirmed by the 
Supreme Court in denying an appeal. The opposite result was reached in an unpublished deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals of Concepcion of April 15, 1974, which relied upon the nominalist 
theory of the Civil Code to reject a request for readjustment of a sum owed because of breach of a 
service contract. Cited in Alvarez Nunez, Las Obligaeiones de Dinero en el Codigo Civil, 41 Rev. Der. 
43,51 n.8 Oan.-June 1974). In Blanco v. Carvacho, 72 R.D.]. 49 (2d Part, 1st Sec., Sup. Ct., 
May 20, 1975), the Supreme Court required monetarily corrected restitution of the portion of the 
purchase price already paid upon annulment of a sales contract. The Court considered adherence 
to the nominalist principle tenable only when there is an express legal provision requiring pay-
ment or repayment in an equal number of currency units, such as C6DlGO CIVIL art. 2199 
(Chile). Article 2199 which is generally considered to be the source of the nominalist principle in 
the Chilean Civil Code, has been explicitly revoked by Decree-Law No. 455 of May 25, 1974 
(Chile). Recent doctrinal writing has taken the position that damages stemming from monetary 
depreciation after breach of contract are compensable under Chilean law. Alvarez Nunez, supra; 
Gesche Miiller, supra note 27, at 7; Santa Maria, Indemnizaciones de Pe'juicios y Desvalorizacion de la 
Moneda, 67 R.D.]. 149 (lst Part. No.8, 1970). 
122. Gerlado Vieira Gonzaga da Silva v. Regina Maria Gonzaga Rammelt et aI., 7 
Jurisprudincia Brasileira [Juris. Bras.], Corre~ao Monetaria 217 (TJRJ 4/22/76); Associa~ao 
dos Servidores Civis do Brasil v. Marilla Ruth Martins Guerra, 7 Juris. Bras., Corre~ao 
Monetaria 259 (TJRS 8/5/75); Jose Roberto Aufiero v. Regina Fabbro Aufiero, 7 Juris. Bras., 
Corre~ao Monetaria 274 (TACSP 11/5/75). 
123. R.E. 83.646 of the Sup. Trib. Fed., 2d Term, cited in Wald, A COTTe~ao Monetaria na 
Jurisprudincia do Supremo Tribunal Federal, at note 29, (forthcoming). The Brazilian Association of 
Magistrates, in conjunction with the Study Commission of the Ipternational Union of 
Magistrates, has recently taken the position that pecuniary obligations should also be subject to 
monetary correction if they remain unpaid. See Araujo Lima, A COTTe~ao Monetaria Vista pela Uniao 
Intemacional dos MagistradiJs, 258 Rev. For. 431, 433 (1977). 
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prevent injustice and to permit these institutions to continue to function as 
normally as possible. In Uruguay, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme 
Court, remained impervious to the problem created by inflation, finally forc-
ing the legislature to intervene with valoristic solutions. The continued func-
tioning of credit and financial markets has required abandonment of the 
nominalist perception of interest for both usury and tax purposes. And the 
continued functioning of medium and long-term credit transactions, as well 
other types of contracts involving deferred performance, has required accept-
ance and institutionalization of indexation. 
Indexation plainly is not a panacea for all of the distortions caused by infla-
tion to the credit and financial markets. It is difficult for many companies and 
individuals to live with credit costs that can be determined only ex post facto. It 
is also difficult for many borrowers to be sure that their incomes will keep pace 
with the rate of monetary correction on their indexed obligations. Especially in 
the short-run, one effect of indexation may be to raise the effective cost of 
credit to borrowers. Comprehensive indexation places enormous pressure on 
the integrity of the index. When billions of dollars turn on a single index point, 
there is a significant danger that index makers will be placed under severe 
political pressure to shade their reporting. In Brazil the government has in-
terfered more or less overtly with the calculation of the index used for 
monetary correction and has insisted that all indexation conform to that single 
index. In such circumstances, the integrity of the indexation process becomes 
quite suspect. 
As long as countries are experiencing chronic inflation, there are decided 
advantages to indexation. Without indexation, it is virtually impossible for 
banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and other types of 
financial intermediaries to function efficiently with inflation. Moreover, in-
dexation helps promote social justice and saving by permitting the small saver 
the opportunity to protect his capital from inflationary erosion and enjoy a real 
rate of return. 
Preservation of effective compensation for tort and contract damages under 
inflationary conditions is also exceedingly difficult without some form of in-
dexation. Where periodical pensions are used to compensate tort plaintiffs for 
lost earnings or future medical expenses, indexation of the award, or funding 
it via indexed securities, as is done in Brazil, makes eminent sense. In coun-
tries where lump sum awards are used, such as Argentina, the availability of 
indexed government bonds permits the plaintiff the option of investing the 
award with both safety and protection from inflation. In this circumstance, the 
plaintiff is overcompensated, for Argentina does not require that the award be 
discounted to present value. In countries such as the United States the option 
of investing in an indexed government security is sorely needed. Discounting 
a tort award to present value without such an option being readily available 
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can produce considerable unfairness to tort plaintiffs even at relatively mild 
rates of inflation. 124 
Legal interest rates should be indexed for inflation, or the amount of 
damages plus interest should be monetarily corrected to prevent the onus of 
monetary depreciation from falling on the shoulders of an involuntary 
creditor. Perhaps the simplest approach would be to set the legal interest rate 
so that it is consistently positive by four or five percent per year. This means 
the legal interest rate would consist of variations in a general price index plus 
four or five percent. If the price index increases at an annual rate of 15 percent 
between the date of the tort or the breach of contract and effective payment, 
the plaintiff should be entitled to legal interest at the rate of 19 or 20 percent. 
This would eliminate the present financial incentive for the defendant to delay 
litigation as much as possible to take advantage of legal interest rates which are 
negative in real economic terms. 
Another way of accomplishing much the same result is by monetary correc-
tion of the damage award. Under this approach damages for breach of con-
tract or tort would be calculated as of the day of the breach or tort. The prin-
cipal plus interest then would be monetarily corrected for general price level 
changes between that date and the date of payment. This technique is slightly 
more favorable to the plaintiff in that it adjusts both the interest rate and the 
principal for inflation. This monetary correction approach eliminates the 
distortions generated by inflation and affords plaintiffs as complete a recovery 
as they would have enjoyed in a stable economy. 
The monetary correction approach, however, does not adjust for changes in 
relative prices. If the price of medical care, wages, or the goods being sold rises 
more rapidly than the general level of prices, the monetary correction ap-
proach will leave the plaintiff with an insufficient amount to secure integral 
reparation. In this event, assessment of damages as of the date ofthe trial, as is 
done in most civil law countries, is more advantageous to the plaintiff than the 
monetary correction approach. If there is a protracted appeal, the debt of 
value theory clearly provides the plaintiff with better protection than the 
monetary correction approach. 
However, there are decided drawbacks to an approach which requires con-
stant judicial reassessment of damages. It is uneconomic and wasteful for busy 
courts to have to revalue damages previously assessed. And, in certain cir-
cumstances, assessing contract damages as of the date of the trial or appeal 
allows the plaintiff to speculate at the defendant's expense. 
124. See Comment, Future Inflation, Prospective Damo.ges, and the Circuit Courts, 63 VA. L. REV. 
105, 125-30 (1977). 
